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TAGS: [MARR](#) [SNAR](#) [PGOV](#) [AF](#)

SUBJECT: AUXILIARY POLICE: SOME PROGRESS BUT HOW MUCH AND
IS IT GOOD ENOUGH

REF: KABUL 1049

Classified By: A/DCM CAROL RODLEY FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D).

1.(C/REL ISAF) Summary: The effort to recruit and train Afghan National Auxiliary Police (ANAP) has been ongoing for slightly over 8 months (the first class of ANAP graduated in October 2006 from Zabul province). Although significant numbers of patrolmen have successfully completed the 10 days of initial training, there are still significant challenges looming on the horizon for this program and the impact upon national security is still questionable. The 10-day basic training in the six priority provinces is 78 percent complete, however, the recruiting and training effort in the east is still at a very nascent stage and training has yet to commence in five additional provinces. Of particular concern is the ability to bring the graduates back for the three additional weeks of sustainment training mandated in the terms of reference agreed to by the Ministry of Interior and the international community. These three weeks of additional training are essential to increasing the effectiveness and professionalism of each patrolman and are also required for the ANAP to transition into Afghan National Police at the end of their one year contract. Amidst frequent reports of ANAP patrolmen not receiving their pay and induction of recruits who fail to meet the requirements outlined in the terms of reference, the impact of the ANAP on national security at the provincial levels is still unclear. The key to the future success of this program remains the continual and sustained monitoring of the international community, including Post, Combined Security Transition Command - Afghanistan (CSTC-A)

and the United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan (UNAMA). Only continued emphasis by all agencies will allow a determination to be made whether the ANAP is truly good enough to have a positive impact on the security situation throughout Afghanistan.

10-Day Basic Training - Making Progress but Still Ongoing

2.(C/REL ISAF) A concerted effort in the six priority provinces (Kandahar, Helmand, Zabul, Uruzgan, Farah, and Ghazni) and recent concentration on the East has resulted in the graduation of significant numbers of ANAP patrolmen. As of May 20th, 2007, approximately 6,600 ANAP patrolmen of the national authorization of 11,271 have graduated from the 2-week basic training and are performing static police duties within the districts from which they were recruited. The effort in the six priority provinces is more than three quarters complete with 4,849 patrolmen of the authorized 6,181 having completed the initial 10-day program of instruction. The completion rates per province range from a high of 97 percent for Helmand (1019 graduates / 1050 authorized) to a low of 55 percent for Farah (194 graduates / 350 authorized) (Note: The completion rates are based upon the records kept at the Regional Training Centers (RTCs) and are only indicative of the number of personnel who have completed

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training. The rates do not include losses due to combat or individuals who have left the ANAP for other employment. (Note. According to the reported statistics, the completion rates for the other provinces are as follows: Kandahar - 84 percent, Uruzgan - 78 percent, Zabul - 66 percent, and Ghazni - 66 percent. End Note.)

3.(C/REL ISAF) In order to more rapidly field ANAP in the East and bolster the Afghan National Security Force,s (ANSF) presence against the expected increase in enemy activity, two ANAP training centers of excellence were established at the Jalalabad and Gardez Regional Training Centers (RTCs). This concentration of training maximizes student throughput, allows the vetting of all recruits to be revalidated to mitigate previously identified errors in the vetting process (Ref A) and lessens the potential dilution of the training curriculum that would result if multiple sites were used to conduct training. The focused ANAP training effort commenced at the Jalalabad RTC on March 25th and has resulted in the graduation of 982 patrolmen (approximately 54 percent of the authorization for Kunar, Laghman, Nangarhar and Nuristan provinces). If the program continues as planned, the Jalalabad RTC will train an additional 838 patrolmen by the end of June and fulfill the authorizations within the aforementioned provinces. The effort to concentrate training at the Gardez RTC commenced on May 5th and will focus on training approximately 1050 ANAP patrolmen within the next 10 weeks (Note: The Gardez RTC is training ANAP who will provide police functions within Khost, Paktia, Paktika and Logar. End note.) The effort at Gardez is slightly less ambitious due to an ongoing training program at the Ghazni PRT which graduated slightly more than 400 patrolmen prior to the initiation of the focused training effort.

4.(C/REL ISAF) Due to the international community,s effort to limit the MOI,s previously uncontrolled recruiting efforts, five provinces still have yet to commence the 10-day training program (Nimroz, Dai Kundi, Ghowr, Faryab, and Kapisa). On May 17th, Wardak province received approval from the Policy Action Group to commence basic training. Prior to the authorization to commence training within any of the previously mentioned provinces, the MOI must present the Policy Action Group (PAG) with a plan that will ensure that facilities exist to support the training, the curriculum can be taught properly, a procedure is in place which will ensure that the graduates receive the authorized salary of \$70 per month on a regular basis, and ANP leadership is in place to supervise the ANAP patrolmen upon graduation (Note: The ANAP only includes patrolmen and does not include non-commissioned officers or officers. Upon graduation of the ANAP patrolmen, ANP officers provide the leadership and are responsible for providing supervision and logistics for the duration of the ANAP contract. End note.) Although the PAG approved the initiation of training in Wardak province, the fact remains that several of the remaining provinces are located in remote areas of the country and will be unlikely to achieve the previously mentioned

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prerequisites required to support the commencement of training The lack of qualified ANP officers to provide leadership to the ANAP graduates, inability of the international community to provide oversight (as an example there are few international community forces and no coalition forces in Nimroz) and inability to ensure that the patrolmen receive their pay pose significant challenges that will require innovative solutions.

Sustainment Training - Essential to Success but a Looming Challenge

5.(C/REL ISAF) The ANAP terms of reference require each patrolman to complete three weeks of additional training which includes two weeks of classroom training and an additional week of range instruction. Although the training should have commenced months ago, not a single patrolman has completed this sustainment training and it is unlikely that the training will commence in the near-term. Task Force Phoenix is developing a plan that will determine where and when sustainment training will commence and will brief this plan to CSTC-A leadership in the near future. However, even if the training were to commence in the near future, a significant concern is the unwillingness of the Chiefs of Police to release the ANAP from their current jobs to attend the additional three weeks of training. (Note: The classroom training focuses on advanced policing skills to include enforcement of the rule of law and the functions and tasks required to protect the average citizen. End Note.) This training is essential in order to provide a greater knowledge of policing functions and increase the professionalism of the force. Currently the ANAP is a force of minimally trained and very basically equipped patrolmen who can provide only the most rudimentary of police functionality. Upon completing the three weeks of sustainment

training, the ANAP patrolmen will have completed a course of training which in many cases exceeds the training provided to a majority of the ANP. (Note. An eight week long curriculum for ANP is a recent police training requirement. In the past most patrolmen only received five weeks of training. End Note.) Of additional importance is the fact that if the ANAP patrolmen fail to complete the sustainment training, they will be unable to transition to the ANP upon completion of their one year contracts.

6.(C/REL ISAF) The completion of this additional training is unlikely to occur in the immediate future due to the nature of the insurgency and subsequent increase in enemy activity, the lack of incentive for the patrolmen to complete the training, and the lack of facilities at the district and provincial levels. The ANAP are in many cases the only security forces present to combat the enemy insurgents, and therefore the district Chiefs of Police will be reluctant to release their patrolmen to attend an additional three weeks of training. Additionally, the leaders are unlikely to explain -- and the patrolmen will probably not understand -- that the failure to complete the additional training

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will result in the cessation of their pay when they are unable to enroll in the ANP at the expiration of their 1-year contracts. A predictable future consequence is that the patrolmen will not attend training and consequently their pay will stop. This will result in the patrolmen failing to understand why they are no longer being paid and ultimately the MOI will face yet another crisis that could have been avoided if the ANP senior leadership had communicated with the patrolmen. The final impediment to the completion of sustainment training involves the dearth of facilities at the district and provincial levels. Although there is a plan to build training facilities, the funding is included within the FY07 Supplemental request and completion of these facilities may require as long as six months. Although temporary facilities are being considered, there are still funding and equipment shortfalls preventing the timely establishment of these facilities. Eventually the MOI will be faced with a decision: continue to sponsor patrolmen possessing only the most basic police training by extending the ANAP program for an additional year, remove from the Afghan National Security Force those patrolmen who fail to complete the mandated sustainment training, or force the district and provincial police leadership to enforce completion of sustainment training.

Making a Difference? The Jury is Still Out

7.(C/REL ISAF) The ANAP have the potential to contribute, in a limited way, to the incremental improvement of both local security and the extension of IROA authority. The graduates are proud, eager and enthusiastic and are often a significantly better force than one would expect, considering that they only completed two weeks of training. Equally important is the factor that this is probably the first time they have participated in a semi-formal organization and were most likely life-long farmers or day laborers prior to commencing this training.

While lauded by several governors and Chiefs of Police, their ability to enforce the rule of law is certainly very basic and they require close and constant supervision. Lacking this, they can easily be co-opted by enemy forces and potentially become a coercive force that is detrimental to the enforcement of public order. Returning to the districts in which they were raised, these patrolmen are extremely susceptible to local power broker influence and if not carefully supervised can easily become involved in widespread corruption. It is readily apparent that with only two weeks of training, these forces are no match for the hardened insurgents or even focused criminal elements. However, perhaps the greatest benefit and certainly most significant risk is that the ANAP are often the only representation of the government of Afghanistan within the districts and are the security force by which the GOA is judged. As such their performance has significant political ramifications at the district and provincial levels. Although not a testament to the ANAP's professionalism or

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capabilities, in many cases governors and provincial and district leaders are requesting additional ANAP. This can most likely be attributed to the fact that these areas lack any other credible Afghan National Security Forces and something is better than nothing. Another consideration is that by performing the static police duties, the ANAP allow regular ANP forces to be employed elsewhere throughout the districts and provinces.

8.(C/REL ISAF) PRT Officers (PRTOffs) offer a wide range of opinions regarding the utility and effectiveness of the ANAP patrolmen. Many state that the patrolmen are adequately performing static policing functions and that the security situation would be worse if these individuals were not in place. The overarching theme is that by manning static checkpoints, the ANP are able to be re-located and serve in other locations throughout the districts. However, others state that the ANAP is often a militia force with loyalty to one or a few individuals that are outside the ANP chain of command. Two points resonate throughout many of the reports: first, the constant attacks on the ANAP manned checkpoints clearly demonstrate that the patrolmen's presence continues to be a threat to the enemy forces; and second, the ANAP require continued monitoring and support if they are going to have a positive impact on the security situation. An additional concern raised by many of the PRTOffs is there is a lack of ANP supervision which results in the ANAP patrolmen not being adequately supplied with food, weapons, and ammunition. Finally of interest is a comment by one PRTOff that the decision to implement the ANAP program in the six priority provinces "clearly showed the Afghan people the true commitment on the part of the Ambassador and the central government." Of concern is the observation which follows this positive statement that "the ANAP program was started with great enthusiasm and hope but has recently lost momentum."

19. Comment.(C/REL ISAF) The effort to field a community-based ANAP has required constant supervision by Post and the international community and will likely continue to require

direct supervision and monitoring. Based upon the limited training, the best result that can be expected is increased security forces at the district level and the development of a community-based police able to provide minimal protection to the local townspeople with whom they were raised. The quality and professionalism of the patrolmen is still questionable but it was never expected that the auxiliary patrolmen would serve as an elite force that would be completely capable of enforcing the rule of law. The ANAP was designed as a temporary force that would provide only the most basic levels of security at a local level and in theory adequately represent the central government. Problems still exist, and the ability of the ANAP to provide even this basic level of security remains questionable. The lack of supervision by competent ANP officers is perhaps the biggest threat to this program as the ANAP patrolmen do not possess the expertise to

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resist common criminals - let alone being able to protect the citizens from hardened insurgents. The supervision is also necessary to ensure that the ANAP patrolmen are adequately equipped and provided sufficient ammunition and food to survive. Although in progress for almost eight months, the ANAP program is still very much in a nascent stage and its impact on the security situation within Afghanistan is still uncertain.

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